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Abstract
We present two logical systems for reasoning about cryptographic constructions which are sound with respect
to standard cryptographic deﬁnitions of security. Soundness of the ﬁrst system is proved using techniques from
non-standard models of arithmetic. Soundness of the second system is proved by an interpretation into the ﬁrst
system. We also present examples of how these systems may be used to formally prove the correctness of some
elementary cryptographic constructions.
© 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
We present two formal deduction systems that can prove cryptographic constructs secure via the
standard of complexity-theoretic cryptography: by giving a reduction between the security of the construct
and that of the underlying primitives. Proofs in both systems avoid unnecessary quantiﬁers, so they may
eventually be helpful in machine-assisted veriﬁcation of protocol correctness. The second is simpler, but
narrower in application, being usable only to reason about computational indistinguishability. We prove
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soundness of themore speciﬁc system by interpreting it in the general system. In fact, themain application
of the general system may be as a “meta-logic’’ for proving soundness of logics of security.
Motivation: Correctness in security is even more important than for general systems, since attackers
will actively seek out and exploit any defect. Unfortunately, it seems also to be even more difﬁcult to
design correct cryptographic protocols than to design correct programs. This is because one needs to
think of the behaviour of the protocols not just as they are intended to be used, but under any feasible
strategy for an attacker.
A central goal of cryptography is to construct functions and protocols solving relatively complex tasks,
such as authentication or pseudo-random generation, from simpler building blocks known as crypto-
graphic primitives. Protocols and functions constructed in this way may themselves be used as primitives
in more complex constructions. The security of the constructed object depends on both the security of the
underlying primitives and the way in which these primitives are used in a construction. A ﬂaw in either
the primitive or the construction can make the constructed function vulnerable to attack. In the absence
of strong lower bounds on complexity, we cannot absolutely prove that any such constructed functions
are secure. However, we would like to certify that the construction itself does not introduce weaknesses
that were not present in the primitives used.
There have been several approaches to validating that a cryptographic construction does not introduce
weaknesses. The standard in the complexity-theory based cryptographic community is the reduction. 3 A
reduction gives a way of translating a successful attack on the protocol or construction into a successful
attack on the primitives used. An important part of proving cryptographic security is precisely deﬁning
what constitutes an attack both on the construction and on the primitives. This method has the advantages
of clearly identifying both the security properties of the construct and the assumptions made about the
primitive. In addition to providing a conceptual foundation for cryptography, reductions can provide
precise, quantitative tools for analyzing speciﬁc protocols [4].
However, it is not clear that systems built using secure cryptographic primitives will be themselves
secure, due to ﬂaws that may be introduced in the protocol or construction which uses the primitives.
First, seemingly trivial modiﬁcations in the protocol can cause it to become totally insecure. Secondly,
the cryptographic protocol itself may be only one component of a much more complex communications
protocol that needs to be veriﬁed as a whole. Finally, the security properties guaranteed need to be
transparent to system builders who wish to incorporate the new tool in their work. It is important to
provide tools for speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation of secure protocols that are understandable to programmers
and can be incorporated into existing methodologies of protocol veriﬁcation. For these reasons, much
research has gone into developing formal methods for the security analysis of protocols.
Most work on the formal veriﬁcation of security protocols (e.g., [8,15,1]) tends to deal with security
more abstractly than in complexity-based approaches. Instead of asking, “If the construct is insecure, is
the primitive insecure?’’ these veriﬁcation methods ask, “If the primitive is secure in an ideal way, is the
construct secure?’’.Application of a primitive is assumed to produce a piece of atomic datawithout internal
structure, which limits the power of an adversary. On the other hand, so called Dolev–Yao assumptions
[15] grant adversaries more power by allowing nondeterministic choice between possible attacks. As a
result of this idealized approach, it is quite possible that a protocol proved correct in the formal system
3 In this paper, we focus primarily on complexity-based, as opposed to information-theoretic security, which does not rely
on the reduction paradigm. However, some of the tools we introduce are in fact applicable to proofs of information-theoretic
security.
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is insecure when instantiated using a secure primitive. However, these logics have been quite successful
in detecting ﬂaws in protocols, and as a basis for automated tools to assist in protocol analysis [28]. This
is largely due to their having simple, intuitive rules that avoid quantiﬁers and explicit reasoning about
probabilities.
Recently, a number of papers have proposed ways to bridge this gap between complexity-theory and
logics for security. The papers [21,25] give a syntactic characterization of a kind of cryptographic security
via equivalence in a probabilistic process calculus. Abadi and Rogaway [2] present a formal system
for reasoning indistinguishability of expressions built using a pseudo-random block cipher. They show
that this logic is sound in the standard sense: any algorithm for distinguishing two expressions proved
indistinguishable can be converted into an attack on the block cipher. (See also [23] for a corresponding
completeness result, and [24,22] for soundness results in the presence of active adversaries.) Universal
composability (e.g., [10,11] and related concepts (e.g., [3]) aim to produce cryptographic primitives that
are “equivalent to the ideal primitive’’ for a variety of applications. It would be interesting to explore
whether protocols proved secure by formal methods are secure when instantiated with sufﬁciently strong
primitives or in the random oracle model.
In this paper, we take a more direct route to merge these two areas. We present two logics for security
that are simpliﬁed formalizations of the language and methods of modern cryptography. Of course,
all papers in complexity theory are formalizable in a sufﬁciently strong logical system, such as Peano
arithmetic. The challenge is coming up with a formal system that is sound in the above sense, powerful
enough to handle a signiﬁcant fraction of constructions, and simple enough to be a useful tool for
verifying that security is maintained as protocols are modiﬁed and combined in implementations. The
difﬁculties involved in formulating such a system include: the formulation of security deﬁnitions, the use
of probabilities in deﬁnitions of security, reasoning about random choices and distributional problems,
quantifying the computational power of adversaries, and intuitive but dangerous mis-applications of
induction. An illustrative example for this last difﬁculty is given in Section 2.
It is the aim of this paper to show that it is possible to formulate logical systems that handle these
issues implicitly. We combine ideas from cryptography, implicit complexity, and proof complexity. By
having a term algebra (such as in Cook’s PV [13]) represent feasible functions, quantiﬁcation over
functions implicitly deﬁnes the scope of feasible adversaries. A counting quantiﬁer is added to allow
simple probabilistic reasoning. Only “small’’ numbers (polynomial length) can be proved to exist, so
one can implicitly deﬁne negligible vs. non-negligible probabilities and limit the scope of induction
arguments. By eliminating asymptotics and explicit resource bounds, we make proofs largely quantiﬁer-
free, consisting of equations and inequalities. The logic is sound, in the standard sense: any security proof
for a construction of one cryptographic object from another provides a reduction from an algorithm that
breaks the constructed object to one that breaks the underlying primitive.
Soundness is proved using nonstandard models of arithmetic, but knowledge of such models is un-
necessary for users—all that is required is an intuition regarding “relatively large’’ values. A similar
situation occurs in the setting of non-standard analysis. It is possible to give an elementary undergraduate
presentation of calculus using inﬁnitesimals (see, e.g., [19]). Proving soundness of the axiomatization of
inﬁnitesimals requires use of nonstandardmodels. However, it is not essential to understand the soundness
proofs in order to use these systems.
The ﬁrst logic we introduce is rather general and powerful, but still a little cumbersome. We show how
it can be specialized to provide simpler logics for limited types of reasoning. In particular, we give a
simple, sound logic for reasoning about computational indistinguishability. The soundness proof for this
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system follows directly from that of our more general system, by interpreting the speciﬁc system in the
general one. Indeed, we think the main application of the general system may be as a “meta-logic’’, to
prove the soundness of more specialized logics for security.
Our work is a preliminary step toward provably sound, practical formal methods for security analysis.
We believe that the primary purpose of formal methods in cryptography is not to make it easier for
cryptographers to produce valid proofs, but to clarify the difference between valid and invalid proofs.
By restricting the kind of proofs allowed, we eliminate many forms of common mistakes that, to the
non-expert, appear indistinguishable from a valid argument. On the other hand, we feel our logic is both
rich enough that it is possible, and simple enough that it is not overly burdensome, to formalize most
proofs in our logic. These proofs could be used by implementers to distinguish harmless and harmful
modiﬁcations and combinations of protocols. Also, it seems possible that the symbolic techniques we are
proposing may scale up, with machine-assistance, to provide veriﬁcation tools for much larger systems
which incorporate cryptographic tools.
Our focus is primarily on constructions of cryptographic functions, rather than protocols. However, we
will also demonstrate how reasoning about simple protocols is supported in our framework by showing
how to model and verify a protocol for ﬂipping coins on a public line [5], which uses the hidden bit
commitment protocol of Naor [26] as a subroutine.
2. A fallacious induction argument
We begin with a fallacious induction proof to demonstrate the potential pitfalls of induction applied
to cryptographic constructions. By an injudicious application of induction we will prove the correctness
of a construction of a pseudo-random generator (PRG) based on the iteration of Goldreich–Levin style
construction of a hard-core predicate. However, we also show that the function which is the result of the
construction is not one-way, yielding a contradiction.
Notation: In this section we will use the following notation. Let {0, 1}∗ denote the set of all strings
over {0, 1}, and {0, 1}n strings of length n. For a ∈ {0, 1}n and b ∈ {0, 1}m, a ◦ b ∈ {0, 1}m+n is the
concatenation of a and b. For a, b ∈ {0, 1}n, a  b denotes mod 2 inner product of a and b (i.e., when a
and b are viewed as bit vectors.) For a ∈ {0, 1}n, and 1i < jn, ai denotes the ith bit of a and a{i...j}
denotes ai ◦ · · · ◦ aj . If A is any set, #A denotes the number of elements in A.
A function f is one-way if it is easy to compute f but any computationally bounded adversary has no
more than a negligible chance of ﬁnding a preimage for f (X) when X is chosen uniformly at random
from {0, 1}n, for sufﬁciently large n. A 0–1 valued function b is a hard-core predicate for a function f if
it is easy to compute b, but any computationally limited adversary has a no better than negligible chance
of doing better than guessing b(X) when given f (X), if X is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}n
for sufﬁciently large n. A function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is a pseudo-random generator (PRG) if any
computationally limited adversary has no more than a negligible chance of distinguishing f (X) from Y
chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}m, whenever X is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}n. The
stretch of f is m − n.
The Goldreich–Levin theorem [18] states that if f is any one-way function, then there is a one-way
function g deﬁned from f and a 0–1 valued function b such that b is a hard-core predicate for g. In
particular, g(x ◦ r) = f (x) ◦ r and b(x ◦ r) = x  r . Note that we are assuming x and r have the
same length. An immediate application of the Goldreich–Levin theorem is a method for constructing a
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PRG with stretch 1 from a one-way permutation. If f is a permutation then so is g, so that g(x ◦ r) is
uniformly distributed and b is a hard-core predicate for g. Let f ′(x ◦ r) = g(x ◦ r) ◦ b(x ◦ r), so that f ′
is pseudo-random (with stretch 1). This f ′ is also one-way, and so we can repeat this process to obtain
another hard-core predicate.
Can we iterate this construction to obtain a (PRG) with stretch n? We now give a fallacious argument
that this is the case. Suppose that f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is a one-way permutation. We deﬁne a sequence
of functions f0, . . . , fn, where fi : {0, 1}n+n2 → {0, 1}n+n2+i as follows: f0(x ◦ r) = f (x) ◦ r , and
for 0 < in, fi(x ◦ r) = fi−1(x) ◦ (x  ri), where r denotes r1 ◦ · · · ◦ rn. Now we have that for each
i, 0 < in, if fi−1 is pseudo-random, then so is fi , by an argument similar to that given above, with a
slightly modiﬁed version of the Goldreich–Levin theorem. But if f is a one-way permutation then f0 is
pseudo-random. Thus we can fallaciously conclude by “induction’’ that fn is pseudo-random.
Is fn really pseudo-random? If it were, it would also be one-way. Now f (x◦r) has the form f (x)◦r ◦ b,





i = bi (1in).
With non-negligible probability (over the choice of r) this system has full rank. Then we can efﬁciently
recover x from f (x ◦ r) for any x and r by solving this system of equations, contrary to the purported
one-wayness of fn.
Where did our “induction’’ argument go wrong? One-way of looking at the problem is that it hides the
fact that at stage i, an adversary’s advantage, or chance of success, depends on i. This advantage could
double at each stage, and still appear to be negligible given the assumption that the advantage at the
previous stage is negligible. However, after n iterations the advantage is increased by a factor of 2n and is
no longer negligible. This is analogous to the familiar situation in which composing a feasible function
with itself a feasible number of times results in a function which is not feasible (e.g. exponentiation by
repeated squaring). Clearly, any system for reasoning formally about such constructions will require a
careful treatment of induction.
3. A general system for cryptographic constructions
Our ﬁrst formal system, whichwe call T , is a system of ﬁrst-order logic which supports reasoning about
probabilities, asymptotics and polynomial-time functions.We begin by giving a high-level presentation of
what types of reasoning can be done in the general formal system. In the following, we use “polynomial’’
as shorthand for “relatively short’’ or “relatively fast’’. Our system deals with the following types of
objects.
1. There is a security parameter presented as two constants: n, a “moderate integer’’, is the security
parameter in dyadic; and s, a “string’’, is the same security parameter in unary, n = |s|. This security
parameter is assumed to be sufﬁciently large that any particular asymptotically true statement is true
of n.
2. Strings are objects that could be inputs, outputs, or random tapes for a probabilistic algorithm that runs
in time polynomial in the security parameter. s is a string, the variables x, y, z . . . represent strings,
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and any efﬁcient function applied to a string yields a string. Using a standard embedding such as
dyadic notation, we can also view strings as integers. Thus the usual arithmetic operations (except
exponentiation) and comparison relations make sense for strings. Strings are implicitly assumed to be
of polynomial length; and variables must be deﬁned to be of some “moderate integer’’ length when
quantiﬁed over.
3. Moderate integers are those polynomially bounded in the security parameter.An integer is moderate if
and only if it is the length of some string, so we don’t need to have new variables of this type. We use
p(n) for p a polynomial or |t | for t a string term to denote a moderate integer. Now, for example, we
can express that q is negligible function by: for every z and every xwith |x| = n, q(x) 1|z| , eliminating
the alternation of quantiﬁers needed for the usual asymptotic deﬁnition.
4. Feasible functions are polynomial-time functions that take strings to strings. They include certain basic
functions, such as a pairing function and arithmetic operations. New feasible functions can be deﬁned
from others by composition or certain forms of recursion. It is well-known (see [12]) that in this way
we are able to deﬁne any particular polynomial-time function. There are also function symbols of each
arity, f, g, . . ., which allow us to quantify over functions. However, quantiﬁcation over strings is not
allowed outside a quantiﬁcation over functions, so functions cannot depend on a speciﬁc input. We
useA,A1, A2 . . . to represent possible adversaries for cryptographic functions, but formally, these are
just the same as other function variables.
5. Counting integers are integers that represent sizes of sets of strings. If (x1, ..xk) is a quantiﬁer-free
formula in string variables x1, . . . xk (possibly involving function variables) and t1, . . . tk are moderate
integer terms, we can form the counting integer term #(|x1| = t1 ∧ · · · ∧ |xk| = tk)(x1, . . . xk) to
represent the number of strings that satisfy  of the given sizes. Arithmetic operations make sense for
counting integers, and their lengths are moderate integers (in particular the length of #(|x| = t)(x)
is bounded by t). However, not being readily computable, they are not allowed to be inputs to function
symbols or treated as strings. Thus, we can reason about C(n) = #(|x| = |n|)(0xn − 1 ∧
gcd(x,n) = 1), that is the number of values smaller than the security parameter which are relatively
prime to it, but we cannot use C(n) as the input to an adversary (unless we can show how to compute
it another way).
6. We can use counting integers implicitly to reason about probabilities, rational numbers in [0, 1].
Pr|x|=t (x) = #(|x|=t)(x)#(|x|=t)(x=x) . Since both numerator and denominator are counting integers, and we can
simulate arithmetic operations on rationals by operations on their numerators and denominators, we
can also reason about probabilities.
Accepting the existence of aﬁxedparametern that satisﬁes all asymptotically true arithmetic statements,
and a distinction between integers that are “polynomially bounded’’ in n and those that are not, requires
some suspension of disbelief. Our feeling is that this will mainly bother those that are mathematically but
not logically sophisticated. The mathematically unsophisticated will accept it unquestioningly, and the
logically sophisticated will realize that any particular proof is only using a ﬁxed set of asymptotic facts
and polynomial bounds, and so is sound for sufﬁciently large n. Those in the middle range might take
some comfort from the fact that we have proved soundness for our system, and be willing to suspend
their disbelief based on this proof.
Note that, in order to consistently represent strings and moderate integers by the same type of variable,
we assume that moderate integers are represented in dyadic notation [29], which gives a 1-1 correspon-
dence between numbers and strings over {0, 1} (in particular, the string x corresponds to the number
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which is one less than the number whose binary representation is obtained by prepending 1 to x, so
 ≡ 0, 0 ≡ 1, 1 ≡ 2, 00 ≡ 3, . . .). We will try to follow the following convention: when the intended
interpretation of a variable is a string, we use x, y, z, . . . , and when the intended interpretation is a (mod-
erate) integer we use i, j, k, . . . .Also, we use 0 and 1 to represent bits (i.e. the members of the alphabet
of binary strings) and 0 and 1 to represent numbers zero and one. We will rely heavily on deﬁnitions
by recursion on dyadic notation and proofs by induction on dyadic notation. Note that in the base case
of such inductions, we are considering the string , which corresponds to the integer 0. In the inductive
step, we assume the desired result for a string  and then try to prove it for the notational successors of
, namely  ◦ 0 and  ◦ 1. Note that if  represents the integer x, then  ◦ 0 represents 2x + 1 and  ◦ 1
represents 2x + 2.
3.1. Syntax
We work in a language which extends that commonly used in bounded arithmetic (see, e.g., [9]), with
several modiﬁcations. First of all, our language ismulti-sorted, meaning that we have variables which vary
over a collection of different domains. In particular, we have variables representing moderate integers,
along with variables which represent k-ary polynomial-time functions for each k1. Also, we introduce
a class of terms, called counting terms which are needed to formalize reasoning about probabilities. Since
counting is ostensibly a non-feasible operation, we need to take some care in deﬁning the contexts in
which counting terms may be used. Due to the restrictions on counting terms, and also on contexts in
which we may quantify over function variables, as described above, our description of the syntax of T
is somewhat involved. It is necessary to give separate deﬁnitions for classes of terms and formulas of
increasing syntactic complexity, culminating with the class of terms and formulas.
Variables: We have a collection of integer variables x, y, z, . . . , i, j, k . . . . We also have for each
k > 0, function variables of arity k f k, gk, hk, . . . , f k1 , f k2 , . . . .
Informally, integer variable represent strings ormoderate integers.Wewill usually adopt the convention
that whenwewant to emphasize that we are using such a variable as the length of a stringwe use i, j, k, . . .
rather than x, y, z, . . . . Function variables of arity k represent k-ary feasible functionals.
Vocabulary: We work over a vocabulary L = LR ∪ LF where
LR = {,=} LF =
{





∪ {Apk | k1}.






arithmetic constants and operations (−˙ denotes cutoff subtraction, that is x−˙y = max{x − y, 0}); |x|
denotes the number of bits in the dyadic notation of x; and x ⊗ y denotes 2|x|·|y| (this smash function
is often denoted # but we need this symbol for other purposes.) The constant s represents the security
parameter (as a unary string), while n represents the length of this string. Note that 0 and 1 represent
integer constants (i.e. 0 is the constant with dyadic representation  and 1 is the constant with dyadic
representation 0.) Apk represents application for k-ary functions.
Basic terms: are deﬁned as follows:
• 0, 1, s and n are basic terms.
• Every string variable is a basic term.
• If r and s are basic terms, then so are r + s, r · s, r ⊗ s, |r|, ⌊ r−˙12 ⌋.
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• If t1, . . . , tk are basic terms and f k is a function variable, then Apk(f k, t1, . . . , tk) is a basic term.
Typically, we will abbreviate Apk(f k, t1, . . . , tk) as f (t1, . . . , tk).
Basic formulas: The class of basic formulas are those which may be formed as propositional combi-
nations of atomic formulas involving basic terms. In particular:
• If s and t are basic terms, then s = t and s t are basic formulas.
• If  and  are basic formulas, then so are ¬,  ∧ ,  ∨ ,  →  and  ≡ .
Counting terms: For any basic formula  and basic terms t1, . . . , tk , we have a counting term
#(|x1| = |t1| ∧ · · · ∧ |xk| = |tk|).
The intended interpretation of such a term is just the number of tuples of strings, with component i having








Terms: Note that by introducing #, we have the possibility of terms which represent functions of
(potentially) more than poly-time complexity. We do not want to allow terms built up arbitrarily from
counting terms. Terms are deﬁned as follows:
• Any basic term or counting term is a term.
• If r and s are terms, then so are r + s, r · s, r ⊗ s, |r|, ⌊ r−˙12 ⌋.
String formulas: Atomic formulas have the form s = t or s t , where s and t are terms. We then have
• Any atomic formula is a string formula.
• If  and  are string formulas, then so are ¬,  ∧ ,  ∨ ,  →  and  ≡ .
• If  is a string formula and x is a string variable, then ∀x and ∃x are string formulas.
If x is a string variable and t is a basic term, ∀x t is an abbreviation for ∀x(x t → ) and ∃x t is
an abbreviation for ∃x(x t ∧ ).
Formulas:
• Any string formula is a formula.
• If  and  are formulas, then so are ¬,  ∧ ,  ∨ ,  →  and  ≡ .
• If  is a formula and f is a function variable, then ∀f and ∃f are formulas.
Due to the restrictions on syntax, the usual notion of substitution of a term for a free variable in a
formula becomes more complicated. To avoid this complication, we will use the notation [t/x] where
 is a formula and t is a basic term, to denote the substitution of t for all free occurrence of x in ′,
where ′ is  with bound variables renamed to prevent the capture of any free variables in t. Note we
also sometimes write (x) to indicate that x are free variables of . In this case, we may also write (t)
instead of [t1/x1] . . . [tk/xk].
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3.2. Axiomatization of the general system
The axioms of the system fall into several groups: logical axioms, BASIC axioms, security param-
eter axioms, poly-time function axioms, counting axioms and an induction axiom. Note that when
we write an axiom as an open formula, we are (implicitly) quantifying universally over all the free
variables.
Logical axioms: We begin with an axiomatization of multi-sorted ﬁrst-order logic with equality [16].
Of course, we need to introduce restrictions which force substitution instances of axioms, as well as
conclusions of rules to result in formulas as we have deﬁned above.
Security parameter axioms: Let k denote the term 1 + 1 + · · · + 1 (k times). The security parameter
axioms state that there is a string of “moderate integer’’ length. For each k0, there is an axiom Sk of
the form |s|k.
BASIC axioms: We have a collection of axiom schemes which capture the intended interpretation of
the basic function symbols in the language. These are based on those given in [9], but adapted to dyadic
integers, and also adding axioms for −˙ and relating n to s.
B1 xy → xy + 1
B2 x = x + 1
B3 0x
B4 (xy ∧ x = y) → x + 1y
B5 x = 0 → 2x = 0
B6 xy ∨ yx
B7 (xy ∧ yx) → x = y
B8 (xy ∧ yz) → xz
B9 |0| = 0
B10 |2x + 1| = |x| + 1 ∧ |2x + 2| = |x| + 1
B11 xy → |x| |y|
B12 (x = 0 ∧ y = 0) → |x ⊗ y| = |x| · |y|
B13 0 ⊗ x = 1
B14 (1⊗ 2x + 1) = 2 · (1⊗ x)∧ (1⊗ 2x + 2) =
2 · (1 ⊗ x)
B15 x ⊗ y = y ⊗ x
B16 |x| = |y| → x ⊗ z = y ⊗ z
B17 |x| = |y|+ |z| → x ⊗ d = (y ⊗ d) · (z⊗ d)
B18 xx + y
B19 (xy ∧x = y) → (2x +22y +1∧2x +
2 = 2y + 1)
B20 x + y = y + x
B21 x + 0 = x
B22 x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1
B23 (x + y) + z = x + (y + z)
B24 x + yx + z → yz
B25 x · 0 = 0
B26 x · (y + 1) = x · y + x
B27 x · y = y · x
B28 (x · y) · z = x · (y · z)
B29 x · (y + z) = (x · y) + (x · z)





B32 x = 0 → |x| = | ⌊x−˙12 ⌋ | + 1







≡ (2x + 1
= y ∨ 2x + 2 = y)
)
B34 yz → y−˙z = 0
B35 zy → (x = y−˙z ≡ y = x + z)
B36 n = |s|
Poly-time function axioms: First of all, for each basic function symbol in our language, we include an
axiom stating that there is a poly-time function deﬁned by that function symbol, e.g., ∃f ∀x∀y(f (x, y) =
x ◦ y). We also have, for each k and i, 1ik an axiom PROJ(k,i) asserting the existence of the ith k-ary
projections function: ∃f k∀x(f (x) = xi) and, for each k, the axiom CONST(k), asserting the existence of
a function which ignores its k inputs and returns the constant 0: ∃f k∀x(f (x) = 0). We also have axioms
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expressing closure properties of poly-time functions. For each k and l we have the axiom COMP(k,l):
∀gk+1∀hk+l∃f k+l∀x∀y(f (x, y) = g(x, h(x, y)))
which states that the poly-time functions are closed under composition. Finally, for each k we have an
axiom LRN(k) expressing closure under limited (i.e. size bounded) recursion on dyadic notation:
∀ gk ∀ hk+2∀bk+1∃f k+1∀x∀y(
f (x, 0) = g(x) ∧
|h1(x, y, f (x, y))| |b(x, 2y + 1)| → (f (x, 2y + 1) = h1(x, y, f (x, y))) ∧
|h1(x, y, f (x, y))| > |b(x, 2y + 1)| → (f (x, 2y + 1) = b(x, 2y + 1)) ∧
|h2(x, y, f (x, y))| |b(x, 2y + 2)| → (f (x, 2y + 2) = h2(x, y, f (x, y))) ∧
|h2(x, y, f (x, y))| > |b(x, 2y + 2)| → (f (x, 2y + 2) = b(x, 2y + 2))).
Counting axioms: The three counting axioms are based on Kolmogorov’s probability axioms (for
discrete probability spaces).
C1 #(|x| = |y|)( ∨ ¬) = y ⊗ 1.
We use the following variant of Kolmogorov’s additivity axiom, adapted from [17]
C2 #(|x| = |y|) = #(|x| = |y|)( ∧ ) + #(|x| = |y|)( ∧ ¬).
The next axiom reﬂects the somewhat complicated situation which arises from the fact that we are not
axiomatizing counting over a single domain, but rather over inﬁnitely many domains, namely {0, 1}n for
every n. This axiom also relates logical implication with bounds on counting. Intuitively, this axiom states
that if there is an injective mapping from the values over a domain which satisfy  to the values over
a (possibly different) domain which satisfy , then the number of values satisfying  is a lower bound
on the number satisfying . Here we will restrict to injective mappings corresponding to a poly-time
relation.While this is not as general as possible, it sufﬁces for our purposes, and also leads to a somewhat
simpler treatment. Poly-time relations may be modeled using binary poly-time functions. Namely, for
every poly-time relation R on ({0, 1})k × ({0, 1})l there is a (k + l)-ary poly-time function r such that
〈x, y〉 ∈ R iff r(x, y) = 0, and vice-versa.
C3 ∃r(Inj[u, v, r] ∧ (∀|x| = |u|)((x) → (∃|y| = |v|)((y) ∧ r(x, y) = 0))) → #(|x| = |u|)
#(|y| = |v|).
Here we have written Inj[u, v, r] as an abbreviation for
(∀|x| = |u|)(∀|z| = |u|)(∀|y| = |v|)(r(x, y) = 0 ∧ r(z, y) = 0 → x = z).
We have also written (∀|x| = |u|) as an abbreviation for
∀x1 . . .∀xk(|x1| = |u1| ∧ . . . |xk| = |uk| → )
(similarly for (∃|x| = |u|)) and if x = x1, . . . , xk , z = z1, . . . , zk , then we have written x = z as an
abbreviation for x1 = z1 ∧ · · · xk = zk .
Induction axiom: We limit induction to open (i.e. quantiﬁer-free) formulas. Note that we could gener-
alize this to bounded formulas, but open formulas seem to sufﬁce for our purposes, and lead to a simpler
soundness proof. Induction is on the length of the dyadic representation of the induction variable. For
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each polynomial p and open formula (x), we have the following induction axiom, which we refer to as
LINDo(p,):
((0) ∧ (∀x < p(|y|)((x) → (x + 1)))) → ∀xp(|y|)(x).
Derivations in T: If  and  are formulas in the language of T , we write T , to indicate that 
may be obtained from  and instances of any of the logical, BASIC, poly-time function, counting, and
induction axioms of T , using the rules of T .
Encoding into ﬁrst-order logic: We may view any formula  of T as a ﬁrst-order formula f o in
a language with one (integer) sort. First of all, since it is possible to index the k-ary polynomial-time
functions using clocked Turing machines (see, e.g., [20]), we may eliminate function variable sorts, and
view k-ary application as a k + 1-ary function on integers. In particular, we have a function apk such
that apk(〈i, k〉, t1, . . . , tk) represents the application of Turing machine i with clock bound nk to inputs
t1, . . . , tk . It is then clear that translations of the polynomial-time function axioms are consistent (in
particular, they hold in the standard model of arithmetic, with an indexing scheme for polynomial-time
functions as indicated above.) Also, by extending the vocabulary of T by introducing for each basic
formula  and each k > 0, a function ctk such that ctk(t1, . . . , tk) represents the number of tuples
〈x1, . . . , xk〉 such that |xi | |ti | and (x1, . . . , xk). Moreover, it is possible to deﬁne ctk and apk , using
standard techniques, in Peano arithmetic. So in fact, every formulas of T may in fact be encoded as a
formula in the language of Peano arithmetic.
3.3. Soundness of the general system
The results on this section rely on ideas from nonstandard models of arithmetic.We begin by describing
what models for the language of T look like.Any such model will have one domain for interpreting string
variables, and a domain for interpreting each of the function variable sorts. In the standard model, the
ﬁrst domain is N, and the kth function domain consists of all polynomial-time functions  : Nk → N.
Function and constant symbols (other than s andn – the standardmodel is not able to satisfy all the security
parameter axioms) are given their standard interpretation, and this interpretation extends naturally to basic
terms. At this point we can deﬁne satisfaction of basic formulas in the standard way, and this allows for
the interpretation of counting terms in the obvious way. Interpretation of arbitrary terms and satisfaction
of general formulas may then be deﬁned via the usual induction.
By a bounded formulawemean a formula inwhich quantiﬁers occur only in the form∀x(|x| |y| → )
or ∃x(|x| |y| ∧ ), where x is a string variable (no function quantiﬁers are allowed in such formulas.)
Deﬁnition 3.3.1. Suppose that( f , z, x) is a formula (where f , z and x are all the free variables occurring
in.) For any sequence of poly-time functions,we say thatholds asymptotically inN if for any sequence
p of polynomials, there is an n0 ∈ N such that for all s, t ∈ N with |t | > |n0| and |si | = pi(|xi |),  holds
in N when the fi’s are interpreted as i’s, the zi’s are interpreted as si’s and x is interpreted as t.
Theorem 3.3.2 (Soundness Theorem). Suppose that 1, 2 and  are bounded formulas such that
T ,2( f , f ′), ∀g∀z1( f , g, z, s)∀g∀z( f ′, g, z, s), (1)
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where f and f ′ are sequences of function variables. We then have the following for all sequences , ′ of
poly-time functions: if , ′ satisfy 2 in N and for every poly-time function , 1 holds asymptotically in
N then for every poly-time function ,  holds asymptotically in N.
Signiﬁcance of the soundness theorem: We want to use the soundness theorem to prove the correctness
of a construction based on some cryptographic primitive. Suppose that f is a function symbol representing
this primitive, and that f ′ is deﬁned using f. The formula 2 has f and f ′ occurring as free variables and
gives the deﬁnition of f ′ in terms of f, while 1 formalizes the security of f and  formalizes the security
of f ′. The security assumption on f states that any poly-bounded adversary has no more than a negligible
chance of breaking f. Thus we have a formula of the form ∀g . . . , where g represents an arbitrary poly-
time adversary (in the sequel, we will typically denote such an adversary function by A). The formula 
has f ′ as a free variable and formalizes the security of f ′, again by using a formula of the form ∀g . . . .
The asymptotic assumption about  is then equivalent to a standard complexity-based assumption about
the security of f. By (1), we can formally derive that f ′ is secure, under the formal assumption that f is
secure. The Soundness Theorem, which gives us an asymptotic conclusion about , allows us to conclude
that f ′ is cryptographically secure. In the next section we will give an example which spells out this
approach in more detail.
A proof of the Soundness Theorem is given below. The ideas behind this proof go back to work by
Parikh [27] on subsystems of Peano arithmetic without exponentiation. We use some simple results of
model theory which follow Wilkie’s paper [30].
Deﬁnition 3.3.3. Let M be a model of T . Let I = 〈I,F I 〉 be a submodel of M with the following
properties:
• F I is a the smallest class of functions on I which contains the interpretation in M of the function
symbols of T , restricted to I, and which is closed under projection, composition and LRN,
• I is closed under all functions in F I , and
• if u ∈ I and |v| |u| then v ∈ I .
I is called an initial segment of M. If I is an initial segment of M and  ∈ F I , there is a natural extension
of  to M, which we denote ∗. These functions agree on all inputs from I.
Note that if M is a model of T, it must contain an element which is the interpretation of the constant
symbol s. By the security parameter axioms, this means that it must contain an element of nonstandard
length. Of course, by the conditions deﬁning an initial segments, any initial segment I must also contain
such a nonstandard element. The following facts regarding initial segments are used in the proof of the
Soundness Theorem.
Proposition 3.3.4. Suppose I is an initial segment of a model M of T . Let t ( f , x) be a term, where f and
x are the only free variables in t. For any tuple u of elements of I and  of elements of F I , t (, u) ∈ I .
Proof. Proceed by induction on t. For terms built up using function symbols and variables, this follows
from the closure of I under F I . Suppose that t is #(|x| = |t ′|). Since |#(|x| = |t ′|)| |(t ′ ⊗ 1)| and, by
assumption, t ′(, u) ∈ I , the result follows from the closure properties of I. The case for more complex
counting terms, involving counting over several variables, is similar. 
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Proposition 3.3.5. Suppose I is an initial segment of a model M. Let ( f , x) be a bounded formula with
all free variables displayed. For any tuple u of elements of I and  of elements of F I ,
I(, u) iff M( ∗, u)
Proof. Proceed by induction on the structure of . The result is immediate for open formulas. The
inductive case for Boolean combinations is also immediate. So suppose that the result holds for ′ and 
has the form∀|x| |t |′. IfM( ∗, u) then I(, u), as universal formulas are preserved by submodels,
and ∗ restricted to I is just . Now suppose I(, u), Consider any v ∈ M with |v| |t (, v)|. By 3.3.4
and the closure properties of I, v ∈ I and so I′(, u, v). By the induction hypothesis M′( ∗, u, v).
So M( ∗, u). The argument for bounded existential formulas follows by the equivalence of ∃x and
¬∀x¬. 
Lemma 3.3.6. If MT + , where all formulas in  are bounded; and I is an initial segment of M, then
IT + .
Proof. Since the basic axioms and ﬁrst two counting axioms are just universal closures of open formulas,
satisfaction inM implies satisfaction in I due to the preservation of universal formulas by submodels. Poly-
time function axioms follow from the closure properties of F I . Formulas in  follow from Proposition
3.3.5. It remains to show the result for C3 and LINDo(p,). For C3, suppose that  ∈ F I and for
sequences v,u of elements of I,
IInj[, u, v] ∧ (∀|x| = |u|)((x) → (∃|y| = |v|)((y ∧ (x, y) = 0)).
Since by taking ∗ to be the extension of  to M, we get
MInj[∗, u, v] ∧ (∀|x| = |u|)((x) → (∃|y| = |v|)((y ∧ ∗(x, y) = 0)),
and so
M∃r(Inj[r, u, v] ∧ (∀|x| = |u|)((x → (∃|y| = |v|)((y → r(x, y) = 0)).
By assumption, this gives
M#(|x| = |u|)#(|y| = |v|),
and then since u,v are elements of I,
I#(|x| = |u|)#(|y| = |v|).
To show the results for LINDo(p,), ﬁx u ∈ I . Suppose that I(0) and that for every v < p(|u|)
I((v) → (v + 1)).
Since  is bounded, it follows by Proposition 3.3.5 that M(0) and that for every v < p(|u|)
M((v) → (v + 1)).
Since MLINDo(p,), it follows that for every wp(|u|), M(w). Now since u ∈ I and I is an
initial segment, it follows that w ∈ I whenever wp(|u|). So by Proposition 3.3.5, I(w) for every
wp(|u|). 
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Proposition 3.3.7. Suppose that I is an initial segment of a model M of T and  ∈ F I is a k-ary function.
Then there is a polynomial p such that for all u1, . . . , uk ∈ I , |(u)|p(|u|).
Proof. We use induction on the structure of . For basic function symbols, we can prove in T that they
are bounded by some polynomial in the size of their arguments. For a function deﬁned by projection the
result is immediate. For functions deﬁned by LRN we use the induction hypothesis to obtain a polynomial
bound for the bounding function. For functions deﬁned by composition, we use the induction hypothesis
and simple arithmetic manipulations on compositions of polynomials which must hold in I. 
Proof. (of the Soundness Theorem). Suppose that 1,2 and  are bounded formulas satisfying (*). Let
 and ′ be sequences of poly-time functions satisfying 2 such that in N, for every poly-time function
 and polynomials p, there is an n0 for that for all x, z with |x|n0, and |zi | = pi(|x|), 1(, , z, x).
For the sake of contradiction suppose, also that it is not the case that for every poly-time function  and
polynomial p, there is an n0 so that for all x, z with |x|n0, and |zi | = pi(|x|), (′, , z, x).
Let 0 be a poly-time function and q a sequence of polynomials which witness the failure of the
conclusion. Expand the language so that there is a function symbol for every poly-time function. To avoid
introducing more notation, we will just write  as the function symbol for the poly-time function . Let T ′
be obtained by adding to T , for every function symbol  and sequence p of polynomials, a formula of the
form (, , 2p1(n), . . . , 2pk(n), s), along with ¬(′, 0, 2q1(n), . . . , 2qk(n), s). We may now translate T ′
into a collection of ﬁrst-order formulas as described at the end of the preceding section. In particular, we
replace each polynomial-time function symbol by an index for the corresponding function, Apk by apk ,
and counting terms by counting functions. Call this new collection of formulas T ′′. Every ﬁnite subset
of T ′′ is satisﬁable because of the asymptotic assumptions about  and . As noted, T ′′ may be viewed
as a set of formulas in the (ﬁrst-order) language of Peanon arithmetic. By compactness T ′′ has a model
M (which will be a nonstandard model of arithmetic). Deﬁne a submodel I with domain consisting of all
u ∈ M such that |u| is polynomial in n. Let F I be the smallest class containing the initial functions on
I and closed under projection, composition and bounded primitive recursion on lengths. By Proposition
3.3.7 I is an initial segment of M, and so by 3.3.6, IT ′ ⊇ T . Furthermore by the construction of I,
I∀g∀z1( f , g, z, s), but I ∀g∀x∀z( f ′, g, z, s), giving a contradiction. 
Extensions of the Soundness Theorem: We note that this proof can be strengthened in order to obtain
the existence of a reduction which takes an adversary breaking the construction to an adversary which
breaks the primitive. Suppose that the assumption of the theorem holds. We introduce a function symbol
A and add an axiom which states that A breaks the construction. We also add function symbols for every
function which is poly-time deﬁnable from A, and for each of these function symbols, an axiom which
states that the function does not break the original primitive. By compactness we obtain a contradiction.
If every ﬁnite subset of this expanded set of axioms is consistent for arbitrarily large n, we can apply
compactness and obtain a contradiction to the soundness theorem. So it must be the case that there is a
ﬁnite collection M1, . . . ,Mk of poly-time oracle TM’s (with an oracle for A) so that for sufﬁciently large
n, and for any adversary A which breaks the construction, there is an i such that MAi is a successfully
adversary for the primitive. Although i may depend on n, we can combine a ﬁnite number of attacks
into a single attack by estimating the success probability of each attack and using the best one. With this
stronger soundness result, it follows that our system is also sound with respect to an adversarial model
where adversaries are modeled by nonuniform families of circuits.
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3.4. Extending the general system
We would like to be able to extend T , by introducing new function constants which represent poly-time
functions. Suppose that T ∃f, for a k-ary function variable f. Then we can expand the vocabulary of T
with a new function symbol, say f. That is, we set L′F = LF ∪ {f}, and extend the set of terms to include
terms of the form f(t1, . . . , tk) where the ti’s are basic terms. If we then set T ′ = T ∪ {[f/f ]}, it is clear
that T ′ is a conservative extension of T . Suppose that T ′ is such an extension of T , and that g,h1,h2,b are
function symbols which have been introduced as part of this extension. Now suppose that we introduce
a new function symbol f, and deﬁne f by recursion on notation from g,h1 and h2, as follows:
f(x, ) = g(x),
f(x, y0) = h1(x, y, f (x, y)),
f(x, y1) = h2(x, y, f (x, y)).
Here we have written  in place of 0 and y0 and y1 in place of 2y + 1 and 2y + 2, respectively, to
emphasize the sense in which our scheme is indeed recursion on notation. Call the conjunction of these
equations , and suppose that
T  → ∀x∀y(|f(x, y)| |b(x, y)|). (*)
It then follows by the LRN axiom that
T ∃f (f (x, 0) = g(x) ∧ f (x, 2y + 1) = h1(x, y, f (x, y)) ∧ f (x, 2y + 2) = h2(x, y, f (x, y))).
It then follows that T , and so we may add f and its deﬁning equations to T . Since for most deﬁnitions
establishing (∗) will be very straightforward, wewill typically just assert the boundwith the understanding
that it may be easily derived in T . As a result, we will freely introduce new function symbols deﬁned
by limited recursion on notation, and extend T by the deﬁning equations for the new function symbol.
Similar arguments may be given for functions deﬁned in simpler ways (e.g., by composition). In some
cases, we simplify deﬁnitions by LRN even further. Suppose that h1 = h2 = h. In this case it makes
sense to think of the recursion parameter as being presented in unary, so that recursion on notation may
be expressed as primitive recursion on the length of the recursion parameter. So we sometimes write
deﬁnitions by LRN in this form, i.e.,
f(x, 0) = g(x),
f(x, i + 1) = h(x, y, f (x, y)),
|f(x, i)| |b(x, i)|.
In the remainder of this section, we will introduce a number of new poly-time functions using the
methodology described above, and also state counting principles C′4–C′11 which may be derived in T .
Proof outlines for each of these counting principles are given in Appendix A. In the sequel, if C is a
counting term of the form #(|x| = |t |), then by #(|u| = |s|)C we denote the term
#(|u| = |s| ∧ |x| = |t |).
We ﬁrst introduce two counting principles which allow us to prove results involving counting terms
via LINDo. Let C(x) be a counting term.
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C′4 #(|x| = 0)C = C(0).
C′5 #(|x| = |y| + 1)C = #(|x| = |y|)C(2x + 1) + #(|x| = |y|)C(2x + 2).
We also have the following principles providing some “boundary’’ values for counting terms:
C′6 #(|x| = |y|)C = (y ⊗ 1) · C (x not free in C).
C′7 |z| = |y| → (#(|x| = |y| ∧ |x| = |y|)(x = z ∧ ) = #(|x| = |y|)(z)).
We also have an inclusion–exclusion principle which is easily derived from C2:
C′8 #(|x| = |y|)( ∨ ) = #(|x| = |y|) + #(|x| = |y|) − #(|x| = |y|)( ∧ ).
Before introducing the next counting principle, we require some deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 3.4.1. The function symbols ◦ and drop are deﬁned using LRN, as follows:
x ◦ 0 = x, drop(x, 0) = x,












|x ◦ y| |x| + |y|, |drop(x, y)| |x|.
Deﬁne the function lv as follows:
lv(x, y) = x−˙drop(x, y) · (1 ⊗ y).
We now have the following counting principle, where C(x1, x2) is any counting term:
C′9 #(|x1| = |y1| ∧ |x2| = |y2|)C = #(|x| = |y1 ◦ y2|)C(drop(x, y2), lv(x, y2)).
We also note the following fact about ◦:
T |x ◦ y| = |x| + |y|.
Using this fact, along with axioms B10 and B12, we may show that if p is any polynomial with positive
coefﬁcients, there is a term t such that for any x, T p(|x|) = |t (x)|. We will write #(|x| = p(|t |)) as an
abbreviation for #(|x| = |t ′|) where t ′ is a term such that |t ′| = p(|t |). We also introduce the following








0 if i > k,
lv(x, (k − (i − 1)) ⊗ 1) otherwise.
By C3, it is clear that any permutation of a domain will preserve counting terms over that domain.
An important special case is the permutation which on input x returns x ⊕ v where ⊕ denotes bitwise
exclusive-or, and v is any ﬁxed value such that |v| = |x|. We ﬁrst require a deﬁnition of ⊕ by LRN.
This is not entirely straightforward, as it requires an extension of LRN to simultaneous multi-variable
deﬁnitions. In fact, such deﬁnitions are admissible, but the proof of this fact requires considerable extra
machinery, which is beyond the scope of this paper. The reader may consult [14] for a very detailed
development.
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Deﬁnition 3.4.2. The function ⊕ is deﬁned as follows:
0 ⊕ 0 = 0,
2x + 1 ⊕ 2y + 1 = 2 · (x ⊕ y) + 1,
2x + 1 ⊕ 2y + 2 = 2 · (x ⊕ y) + 2,
2x + 2 ⊕ 2y + 1 = 2 · (x ⊕ y) + 2,
2x + 2 ⊕ 2y + 2 = 2 · (x ⊕ y) + 1,
|x ⊕ y| |x|.
We then have the following counting principle for any counting term C(x):
C′10 ∀v(|v| = |y| → #(|x| = |y|)C = #(|x| = |y|)C(x ⊕ v)).
We introduce terms of the form #(ij ∧ |x| = |t |) which is used to count the number of tuples 〈i, x〉
for which  holds where i ∈ {0, . . . , j} and |x| = |t |. To do this, we ﬁrst deﬁne the auxiliary function
bin.
Deﬁnition 3.4.3. The function bin is deﬁned by
bin(x) = x − (x ⊗ 1) + 1.
Intuitively, bin(x) gives the integer whose (possibly left-zero-padded) binary notation equals the dyadic
notation of x. For example, the dyadic notation of 9 is 010, which is the (left-zero-padded) binary notation
of 2, and bin(9) = 9 − (9 ⊕ 1) + 1 = 9 − 23 + 1 = 2. Note that in general, the length of the binary
notation of a number might be one greater than the length of its dyadic notation. For example, the dyadic
notation of 8 is 001, while its binary notation is 1000. With these considerations in mind, we may write
#(ij ∧ |x| = |t |)
as an abbreviation for
#(|x| = |j | + 1 ∧ |x| = |t |)(bin(x)j ∧ [bin(x)/i]).
We have the following recursion-like principle for terms of this type. Suppose that C(i) is a counting
term.
C′11 #(ik + 1)C = C(k + 1) + #(ik)C.
The last counting principle we describe captures the notion of telescoping sums used in hybrid arguments
C′12 ∀m |z|(∀i < m(C(i) = C′(i + 1)) → #(im)C − #(im)C′ = C(m) − C′(0)).
3.5. Sample proofs
We will now use the soundness theorem to prove the correctness of a construction for “stretching’’
the output of a pseudo-random generator (PRG). The reader should note that the primary purpose of this
example is to demonstrate the nuts-and-bolts of proofs in the system T . It is not our contention that such
proofs are particularly perspicuous, or amenable to automation. In fact, our ultimate goal is to develop
systems which allow more direct reasoning about cryptographic constructions (such a system is presented
in Section 4). In this setting, the system T can be viewed as an intermediate step. The techniques presented
here can be extended to give general soundness results for the system of Section 4. Below we also prove
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the correctness of a coin-ﬂipping protocol, demonstrating that T may also be used to reason about simple
protocols.
To begin, we must show how the deﬁnition of PRG can be formalized in our framework. Recall that
for any positive polynomial p, a poly-time function g : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ is a PRG with stretch p(n) if
for all x, |g(x)| = |x| + p(|x|) and if for every poly-time function A : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}, and all
polynomials r and q, there is an n0 such that for all nn0,
PrR,X[A(R, g(X)) = 1] − PrR,Y [A(R, Y ) = 1]1/q(n), (3)
where R ∈U {0, 1}r(n), X ∈U {0, 1}n, and Y ∈U {0, 1}n+p(n).






















is an abbreviation for s1 · t2 ·u2 − t1 · s2 ·u2u1 · s2 · t2. In the sequel, we will sometimes write
formulas using standard probability notation for the sake of readability. Such formulas may be formalized
in the language of T , as described here. Up to this point, as we have been focusing on the soundness of
T , we do not want to introduce a more complex syntax involving symbols such as Pr, as this would only
complicate the soundness proof. When applying the system, of course, we want a richer syntax, which
can easily be built up on top of T . We will use this richer syntax in our examples of proofs in T .
A few more words on methodology: In this setting, we start by assuming the existence of some primitive
f, which is a poly-time function satisfying some security property. The security property for f is given
in the assumption ∀A∀r∀z1(f,A, r, z) for the Soundness Theorem. Here, f is an unbound function
variable in , signifying that it is an (unspeciﬁed) poly-time function satisfying the security property.
Based on this primitive, we construct to deﬁne a new object f ′ which, under the assumptions about f, is
a poly-time function satisfying some security property. Note that the equations used to deﬁne f ′ from f
are also given as part of the assumption in the Soundness Theorem in the formula 2. It is important to
remember that there are two orthogonal concerns related to the correctness of the construction. The ﬁrst
is that the constructed object is indeed a polynomial-time function. Here we may follow the methodology
for introducing new polynomial-time functions described in Section 3.4. The second concern is verifying
that the constructed object satisﬁes its security requirements, assuming that the primitive does. This
veriﬁcation depends on an application of the Soundness Theorem.
Deﬁnition 3.5.1. Suppose that f is a PRG with stretch 1. We write f (x) as b(x) ◦ r(x) where |b(x)| = 1
and |r(x)| = |x|. Deﬁne f ′, by f ′(x, i) = b′(x, i) ◦ r ′(x, i) where
r ′(x, 0) = x b′(x, 0) = 0,
r ′(x, i + 1) = r(r ′(x, i)) b′(x, i + 1)
= b′(x, i) ◦ b(r ′(x, i)),
|r ′(x, i)| |x| |b′(x, i)|i.
Note that this is the construction of Goldreich and Micali presented in [7], described using recursion on
notation. The bounds on the growth of r ′ and b′ are not required for the correctness of the construction,
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but to ensure that they are feasible functions. This allows us to use the LRN axiom to introduce function
symbols r ′, b′ and f ′ which satisfy the given deﬁning equations.
We now show how, based on our soundness theorem, we can use b′ to obtain a PRG with stretch n
from a PRG f with stretch 1. (We could in fact obtain a PRG with stretch p(n) for any polynomial p. We
are limiting ourselves to stretch n just to simplify the presentation.)
Theorem 3.5.2. Let 1(f,A, r, z) and (b′, A, r, z) be the formulas of T corresponding, respectively to
the following statements:
PrR,X[A(R, f (X)) = 1] − PrR,Y [A(R, Y ) = 1]1/|z|,
where R ∈U {0, 1}|r|, X ∈U {0, 1}n and Y ∈U {0, 1}n+1, and
PrR,X[A(R, b′(X, 2n)) = 1] − PrR,Y [A(R, Y ) = 1]1/|z|,
where R ∈U {0, 1}|r|, X ∈U {0, 1}n and Y ∈U {0, 1}2n, and let 2 be the formula
(∀|x|n)(∀in)′2,
where ′2 is the conjunction of the equations from Deﬁnition 3.5.1. Then T ,2,∀A∀r∀z1∀A∀r∀z.
From this result and the Soundness Theorem for T , it follows immediately that
Corollary 3.5.3. If f is a PRG with stretch 1, then x.b′(x, 2|x|) is a PRG with stretch 2|x|.
Proof ofTheorem 3.5.2. Our proof follows the form of a standard hybrid argument.We will use the more
concise probability notation described above. As a further abbreviation, if A is a 0–1 valued function, we
write A(x) for the formula A(x) = 1. The proof will be by contradiction, so we will actually show that
T ,2,¬∀A∀r∀z¬∀A∀r∀z1.
To begin we need to put the deﬁnition of b′ from 2 into a form useful for deﬁning an adversary which
breaks f. We may show by LINDo that
T ,2∀x∀i2n(b′(x, i + 1) = b(x) ◦ b′(r(x), i)). (†)
In particular, when i = 0 we have
b′(x, i + 1)= b′(x, 1) = b′(x, 0) ◦ b(r ′(x, 0)) = 0 ◦ b(x) = b(x) ◦ 0 = b(x) ◦ b′(r(x), 0)
= b(x) ◦ b′(r(x), i).
Now assume that the equation holds for all x and for i = k < 2n. When i = k + 1 we have
b′(x, i + 1) = b′(x, k + 2)
= b′(x, k + 1) ◦ b(r ′(x, k + 1))
= b(x) ◦ b′(r(x), k) ◦ b(r ′(r(x), k)
= b(x) ◦ b′(r(x), k + 1)
= b(x) ◦ b′(r(x), i).
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Deﬁne the poly-time hybrid function h as follows:
h(y, i, u) =
{
y{1...2n−(i+1)} ◦ u1 ◦ b′(u{2...n+1}, i) if i2n,
0 otherwise.
From the assumption¬∀A∀r∀z, we haveA0,r0 and z0 such that¬1(b′, A0, r0, z0).We may now deﬁne
A1, the poly-time adversary which will witness that f is not a PRG. A1 is deﬁned as follows:
A1(s, u) =
{
A0(s1, h(s2, bin(s3), u)) bin(s3) < 2n,
0 otherwise,
where s3 = lv(s, 2(2n) + 1), s2 = lv(drop(s, s3), (2n) ⊗ 1) and s1 = drop(s, s2 ◦ s3). In particular, this
means that if s = r ◦ y ◦ t with |y| = 2n and |t | = |2(2n) + 1|, then s1 = r , s2 = y and s3 = t and so
by C′9 we have for any u and r1 such that |r1| = |r0| + 2n + |2(2n) + 1|,
Pr|s|=|r1|
[A1(s, u)] = Pr
i<2n
|y|=2n,|r|=|r0|
[A0(r, h(y, i, u))]. (*)
Now by (†), C′6 and C′9 we have, for i < 2n − 1,
Pr|r|=|r0|
|x|=n,|y|=2n
[A0(r, h(y, i, f (x)))] = Pr|r|=|r0|
|x|=n+1,|y|=2n
[A0(r, h(y, i + 1, x))]. (**)
We then have
Pr|s|=|r1|,|x|=n
[A1(s, f (x))] − Pr|s|=|r1|,|x|=n+1[A1(s, x)]
= Pr|r|=|r0|,i<2n
|x|=n,|y|=2n
[A0(r, h(y, i, f (x)))] − Pr|r|=|r0|,i<2n
|x|=n+1,|y|=2n







[A0(r, h(y, 2n − 1, f (x))]
− Pr|r|=|r0|
|x|=n+1,|y|=2n
[A0(r, h(y, 0, x))]
⎞






[A0(r, b′(x, 2n))] − Pr|r|=|r0|,|x|=2n[A0(r, x)]
)
(by †, C′6 and C′9)
>
1
2n|z0| (by the assumption ¬(b
′, A0, r0, z0)).
Choosing z1 such that |z1| = 2n|z0| (say z1 = (s ◦ s)⊗ z0,) we have ¬1(f,A1, r1, z1), from which we
obtain ¬∀A∀r∀z1(f,A, r, z). 
The framework that we have introduced so far is not general enough to model arbitrary notions of
security for protocols. For example, to deal with adversaries with some form of chosen-message attack
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would require the introduction of functionals. However, we do have sufﬁcient machinery to model proto-
cols in which only one execution of the protocol is analyzed, or in which the adversary is non-adaptive.
As an example, we now show how to model and verify a protocol for ﬂipping coins on a public line [5],
which uses hidden bit commitment as a subroutine. In order to achieve hidden bit commitment, we use a
construction of Naor [26], which uses a pseudo-random generator as a primitive.
The following is a high-level description of the protocol: Alice sends Bob a random v ∈U {0, 1}3n.
Bob computes g(s) where s is a random n bit string and g is a pseudo-random generator from n bits to
3n bits, and picks a random b ∈U {0, 1}. To commit to b = 0 he sends g(s), to a 1, he sends g(s) ⊕ v.
Then (for coin-ﬂipping) Alice sends Bob a random b′ ∈U {0, 1}. Bob reveals s and b and outputs b ⊕ b′.
Alice outputs b ⊕ b′ if the above checks out; otherwise she rejects.
We use lower case for the correct protocol and upper-case for a hypothetical possibly cheating message.
We can model the correct protocol as 3 functions for each player: a1(v, b′) = v is Alice’s ﬁrst message,
a2(v, b′, B1) = b′ is Alice’s second message and aout(v, b′, B1, (B, S)) = B ⊕ b′ if g(S) = B1 ⊕ v
or g(S) = B1 (depending on whether B is 1 or 0), reject otherwise. Similarly, b1(b, s, A1) = g(s) or
g(s) ⊕ A1 depending on b, b2(b, s, A1, A2) = (b, s), and bout(b, s, A1, A2) = b ⊕ A2.
An adversary for Bob (i.e., a cheating Alice) is a bit c and a pair of functions A2(r, b1(A1(r), b, s))
and A1(r). The adversary succeeds if probability bout(b, s, A1, A2) = c > 12+ a non-negligible func-
tion. Similarly, a successful cheating Bob, an adversary for Alice, is a bit c and functions B1(r, A1),
B2(r, A1, A2) so that aout(v, b′, B1, B2) = c with probability > 12+ non-negligible amount.
We now outline how to prove in T that the protocol outlined above is correct, i.e. that there are no
successful cheating adversaries. We ﬁrst consider a cheating Alice. Starting with the formal deﬁnition of
PRG given above, along with the easy to establish fact (using counting axiom C′10) that for any function










we can derive that for any function A, any r0 and any v with |v| = 3 · n
Pr|r|=|r0|
|s|=n
[A(r, g(s) ⊕ v) = 0] − Pr|r|=|r0|
|s|=n
[A(g(s)) = 0] 1|z| .
It then follows that for any adversaries A1, A2, and any r0 and z
Pr|r|=|r0|
|s|=n
[A2(r, b1(A1(r), 1, s)) = 0] − Pr|r|=|r0|
|s|=n
[A2(r, b1(A1(r), 0, s)) = 0] 1|z|
But then for any adversaries A1, A2, and any r0, z and c ∈ {0, 1}
Pr|s|=n,|r|=|r0|
|b|=1
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Fig. 1. Proof of correctness of the coin-ﬂipping protocol.
For a cheating Bob, we want to show that for c ∈ {0, 1} and functions B1(v, r) and B2(v, r, a2(v, b′,
B1(v, r))) a cheating Bob uses,
Pr|v|=3n,|r|=|r0|
|b|=1
[aout(b, v, B1(a1(v, b), r), B2(v, r, a2(v, b, B1(a1(v, b), r))))] = c]1/2 + 1/|z|.
This is purely a counting argument; no complexity theory assumptions are necessary. Using the deﬁnitions
of a1(v, b) = v, a2(v, b, B1) = b we can re-write the probability above as
Pr|v|=3n,|r|=|r0|
|b|=1
[aout(b, v, B1(v, r), B2(v, r, b)) = c].
Then substituting the deﬁnition of aout , and letting B2(v, r, b) = B(v, r, b), S(v, r, b), we obtain the
sequence of equalities and inequalities given in Fig. 1. The resulting proof is not completely formalized,
but each line follows from the cited counting axioms, or else from BASIC axioms and the deﬁnitions of
Pr and Exp.
4. A system for computational indistinguishability
Adrawback of the system presented in the preceding section is that it still requires us to reason explicitly
about probabilities. In this sectionwe show that by restricting our attention to a particular security property,
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we are able to eliminate the need for such explicit reasoning.We will present a system for reasoning about
computational indistinguishability, in which proofs are essentially equational. We will prove soundness
for this system by interpreting it in the general system from the previous section and then appealing to
the soundness proof that we have already given for this system. In fact, we see this kind of soundness
proof as the most important application of the general system: it provides a formal framework for doing
“meta-proofs’’ for systems providing more direct forms of reasoning. While the system we present here
could be viewed as an extension of T , it is in fact more self-contained, and does not require most of the
machinery of T . As we will see, one rule in this system does require external reasoning, that is, to apply
the rule we ﬁrst need to derive statements of the form ∀x(f (x) = g(x). However, we do not need the full
power of T to do this.
Wework in a languagewith termswhichdenote probabilistic poly-time (PPT) functions.More precisely,
terms denote PPT function ensembles. To this end we have a collection of basic functions and typical clo-
sure schemes for deﬁning poly-time functions. We also include terms of the form let i ← rand(p(n)) in t
and let x ← rs(p(n)) in t , for any polynomial p. Intuitively, the meaning of the ﬁrst kind of term is just
the meaning of t where variable i is selected uniformly at random from the set {0, . . . , p(n) − 1}, while
the meaning of the second kind of term is t where x is selected uniformly at random from strings of length
p(n). So rand is shorthand for “random index’’ while rs is shorthand for “random string’’. Note that we
only allow the formation of terms of the ﬁrst (second) form when i is free in t (resp. x is free in t.) In cases
where there is no ambiguity, we sometimes write, e.g., t[rs(p(n))/x] instead of let x ← rs(p(n)) in t , say
when t has only one occurrence of x. Here t[s/x] means term t with all free occurrences of x replaced
by s. Free variables are those which are not in the scope of a let. We always assume that substitution is
done in such a way as to avoid variable capture, by changing the name of bound variables if necessary. In
general, we refer to i ← rand(n) and x ← rs(n) as random bindings. Suppose b1, . . . , bk is a sequence






in t . Note that with this syntax,
the ordering of bindings from top to bottom is signiﬁcant because for 1i < jk, bj may refer to the
variable bound in bi . We say that a term is normal if it has the form let b1 in . . . let bk in t where t is just
a basic term of T. If
v = let b1 in . . . let bk in t
is a normal term and x is a free variable (i.e. not bound by any of the bi’s) occurring in t and
u = let c1 in . . . let ck in s
is any normal term, then by v{u/x} we denote the normal term
let b1 in . . . let bk in let c1 in . . . let ck in t[s/x],
where t[s/x] just denotes the usual substitution for s in x. A normal term is closed just in case all the
variables occurring in t are bound in one of the b1, . . . , bk . Suppose that s and t are closed normal terms.
We introduce formulas of the form s ≈ t , whose intended meaning is that the distribution ensembles
represented by s and t are computationally indistinguishable. We would like to reason directly about ≈.
To this end, we will introduce a number of rule schemes which capture intuitive properties of ≈. The
soundness of these rules may be shown as follows: we ﬁrst given a translation of formulas of the form
s ≈ t into the language of T . We then show that the translation of each of the rules may be proved in T .
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Fig. 2. Rules for computational indistinguishability
Soundness then follows from the soundness of T with respect to cryptographic interpretations. Each of
the rules given below have fairly simple proofs in T , as we show in Section 4.1.
To begin with, we have rules stating the ≈ is reﬂexive, symmetric and transitive. The remaining rules
are given in Fig. 2. The (UNIV) rule relates universally quantiﬁed equality statements provable in T to ≈.
In this rule, s and t are terms of T, and Q1, . . . ,Qk is a sequence of quantiﬁers of the form ∀|x|p(n)
or ∀i < p(n). Each bi is a random binding of the form x ← rs(p(n)) (resp. i ← rand(p(n))), which
corresponds to Qi . All the free variables of s and t must appear in some Qi . Note that the choice of
T in the antecedent of this rule is somewhat arbitrary and was made here for the sake of concreteness.
We could actually choose a system without much of the extra machinery introduced in T , say a suitably
formulated version of Cook’s PV [13].
The (SUB) rule states that we may substitute indistinguishable terms into any probabilistic polynomial-
time context. Here v is any term in the extended language whose only free variable is x.
The (EDIT) rule enables us to merge, split and/or shorten random strings, the result being indistin-
guishable from a randomly chosen string of the appropriate length. In the statement of this rule, ©kj=1 ti
denotes t1 ◦ · · · ◦ tk .
The (H-IND) rule has the ﬂavour of an induction rule, but it also captures the basic fact about compu-
tational indistinguishability required for hybrid arguments.
We now repeat the proof from the previous section that the function f ′ given in Deﬁnition 3.5.1 can
be used to deﬁne a pseudo-random generator with stretch n. Suppose f (x) = b(x) ◦ r(x) is a PRG with
stretch 1. We can capture this with
let x ← rs(n) in f (x) ≈ let x ← rs(n + 1) in x.











in x{1} ◦ b′(x{2...n}, i). (†)
Suppose that r ′ and b′ are deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 3.5.1. We want to show that x.b′(x, 2n) is a PRG
with stretch n. Recall that from the proof of Theorem 3.5.2, for any x and in, we have b′(x, i + 1) =
b(x)◦b′(r(x), i).While this proof was given in T , and examination of the proof shows that it uses purely
equational reasoning along with induction on notation. Such a proof could be formalized in a system
much simpler than T , for example Cook’s PV. However, having established this equality, by UNIV we












in b(x) ◦ b′(r(x), i).



































in h(z, x, i) (by UNIV)










in h(z, x, 2n). But for any z
and x with |z|n we have h(z, x, 0) = z ◦ x and h(z, x, 2n) = b′(x, 2n). By UNIV, EDIT and SUB we
then obtain let x ← rs(n) in b′(x, 2n) ≈ rs(2n), as required.
Below we give another example in this system, proving that next-bit unpredictability implies pseudo-
randomness.
4.1. Soundness via interpretation in the general system
We interpret
let b1 in . . . let bk in t ≈ let c1 in . . . let cl in s












Soundness of the system for computational indistinguishability is established by proving the interpre-
tation of each of its rules in T . These proofs use the properties of counting terms in an essential way.
We explain how soundness for each of the rules may be proved. In some cases we consider a concrete
instantiation of the rule rather than its general form in order to make the underlying idea more apparent.
Reﬂexivity, symmetry and transitivity are obvious.
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For UNIV, we have the assumption Q1 . . .Qk(s = t). Suppose for concreteness that we have ∀|x| =
n∀i < n(s = t). Note that for any , it follows by C3 that
#(|x| = n ∧ i < n) = #(|x| = n ∧ i < n)(|x| = n ∧ i < n ∧ ).
From this it follows that for any  with free variable y,
#(|x| = n ∧ i < n)[s/y] = #(|x| = n ∧ i < n)[t/y],
The interpretation of the conclusion of the UNIV rule follows as a special case.












For any A, we specialize this formula to poly-time term x.A(v(x)) (such a poly-time function exists, via
























giving the interpretation of the conclusion of the rule.
EDIT follows fairly directly from the properties of #. For H-IND, we use the telescoping sum principle
C′12. Let t be the probabilistic term in the premise the H-IND rule. For concreteness, suppose that t has
the form let x ← rs(n) in let j < n in t ′. Let C be the counting term #(|x| = n∧j < n)(A(t) = 1). From
C′12 we have
C[n/i] − C[0/i] = #(i < n)C[i + 1/i] − #(i < n)C.
This is sufﬁcient for establishing the interpretation of H-IND in T .
4.2. A sample proof relating pseudorandomness and next-bit unpredictability
We now give a proof in the system for computational indistinguishability, that next-bit unpredictability













in f (x){1...i} ◦ B.
Note that in order to deﬁne this notion in our system, we have deviated from the original deﬁnition of [6]
which is not presented in terms of computational indistinguishability. However, it is not hard to see that
our deﬁnition is indeed equivalent to the more standard one.
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We now give a proof in our system of the result of [31], that if f is 2n-next bit unpredictable then f is a




































in h(x, i + 1) (by UNIV)
Now since h(z, x, 0) = z and for z with |z| = 2n, h(z, x, 2n) = f (x), it follows by H-IND, EDIT and
SUB that let x ← rs(n) in f (x) ≈ rs(2n), as required.
5. Conclusions and further work
The simple examples we have given here demonstrate that it is possible to give “direct’’ proofs, not
involving the use of asymptotic notions, of a standard cryptographic construction. In the case of the
system with a primitive relation for computational indistinguishability, we were also able to avoid explicit
reasoning about probabilities.
There are a number of ways in which we could strengthen the systems presented here, for example:
adding type-two functionals (i.e. functions which take functions as inputs) to the ﬁrst-order system in
order to allow reasoning about protocols and adaptive message attacks through the use of so-called oracle
adversaries; developing proof-theoretic techniques which allow us to extract quantitative information
about reductions from correctness proofs; looking at specialized formal systems for other primitive
notions (e.g., “one-wayness’’). Other directions for future work include examining the strength of the
systems we have presented, e.g., by relating the power of the logic for computational indistinguishability
to the Abadi-Rogaway logic, or by providing sufﬁcient conditions for protocols to be provably sound.
One way of viewing the systems that we have presented is as a layer between low-level cryptography
and higher-level systems for reasoning about security. It would be interesting to formalize this idea,
say by providing a proof of the universal composability [10] of a primitive in one of our systems (or
an extension thereof), and then using a more abstract system (essentially using information-theoretic
reasoning) to reason about the security of protocols which use the primitive. In this way we could provide
an end-to-end, cryptographically sound, formalization of security proofs.
We have not considered questions about the decidability of the systems we presented, nor have we
seriously considered practical means for automated reasoning using them. While decidability in itself is
not a particularly interesting question, automation is an area which demands further investigation.
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Appendix A. Properties of counting terms
In this appendix we give outlines for proofs of the counting principles given in Section 3.4. While the
proofs are not fully formalized in T , they are given with a sufﬁcient level of detail to make formalization
relatively straightforward.
Proposition A.0.1. T |x| = 0 → x = 0.
Proof. Suppose that x = 0. By B32, |x| = | ⌊x−˙12 ⌋ | + 1. Let y denote | ⌊x−˙12 ⌋ |. Suppose that |x| = 0.
Then y + 1 = 0, so by B3, y + 1y. Now by B6 and B1, yy + 1. So by B7, y = y + 1. But this
contradicts B2. 
Proposition A.0.2. (C′4) For any counting term C,
T #(|x| = 0)C = C[0/x].
Proof. Say C = #(|x| = |y|). Consider any x, x satisfying |x| = 0 ∧ |x| = |y| ∧ . By A.0.1, x = 0,
so |x| satisﬁes [0/x]. It follows by C3 that #(|x| = 0)CC[0/x]. It also follows by B9 and C3 that
C[0/x]#(|x| = 0)C. 
Proposition A.0.3. (C′5) For any counting term C,
T #(|x| = |y| + 1)C = #(|x| = |y|)C[2x + 1/x] + #(|x| = |y)C[2x + 2/x].
Proof. Suppose that C is #(|x| = |y|). We ﬁrst show that
T #(|x| = |y|)C[2x + 1/x] + #(|x| = |y)C[2x + 2/x]#(|x| = |y| + 1 ∧ |x| = |y|). (*)
Assuming
|x| = |y| ∧ |x| = |y| ∧ [2x + 1/x]
we have
T z = 2x + 1 →
(








It then follows by C3 (taking r(x, x, z, y) = 0 iff z = 2x + 1 and y = x), that
T #(|x| = |y|)C[2x + 1/x]#(|x| = |y| + 1 ∧ |x| = |y|)
(
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Similarly, we may show that
T #(|x| = |y|)C[2x + 2/x]#(|x| = |y| + 1 ∧ |x| = |y|)
(








By B33 we then have












The inequality (*) now follows by C2. To obtain equality, we must show
T #(|x| = |y| + 1)C#(|x| = |y|)C[2x + 1/x] + #(|x| = |y)C[2x + 2/x].
By C2,
T #(|x| = |y| + 1)C#(|x| = |y| + 1 ∧ |x| |y|)
(



















But we can show by C3,
T #(|x| = |y| + 1 ∧ |x| |y|)
(








and by C3 and B33,











C[2x + 2/x]. 
Proposition A.0.4. (C′6) For any counting term C such that x is not free in C,
#(|x| = |y|)C = (y ⊗ 1) · C.
Proof. By C′4, we have #(|x| = |0|)C = C[0/x] = C = (0 ⊗ 1) · C. Assuming that when |y| = k we
have #(|x| = |y|)C = (y ⊗ 1) · C, we obtain
#(|x| = |2y + 1|)C = #(|x| = |y|)C[2x + 1/x] + #(|x| = |y|)C[2x + 2/x] (by C′5)
= #(|x| = |y|)C + #(|x| = |y|)C (since x is not free in C)
= (y ⊗ 1) · C + (y ⊗ 1) · C (by assumption)
= ((2y + 1) ⊗ 1) · C.
So when |y| = k + 1 we have #(|x| = |y|)C = (y ⊗ 1) · C. The result then follows by LINDo. 
Proposition A.0.5. (C′7)
T |z| = |y| → #(|x| = |y| ∧ |x| = |y|)(x = z ∧ ) = #(|x| = |y|)[z/x].
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Proof. From the properties of =, it follows immediately from C3 (taking r(x, x, y) = 0 iff y = x and
x = z) that for any z,
T #(|x| = |y| ∧ |x| = |y|)(x = z ∧ )#(|x| = |y|)[z/x].
Similarly, it follows by C3, that
T |z| = |y| → #(|x| = |y|)[z/x]#(|x| = |y| ∧ |x| = |y|)(x = z ∧ ). 
For C′8, we ﬁrst need to establish some facts about ◦, drop and lv.
Proposition A.0.6. T x ◦ y = y + x · (1 ⊗ y).
Proof. Use induction on |y|. When |y| = 0, we have y = 0 byA.0.1, so that x ◦y = x = y +x · (1⊗y).
Now suppose the result holds for any z with |z| = k. Consider y with |y| = k + 1, say y = 2z+ 1 where
|z| = k. We then have
x ◦ y = 2 · (x ◦ z) + 1
= 2 · (z + x · (1 ⊗ z)) + 1 (by IH)
= (2z + 1) + 2x · (1 ⊗ z) (by B29, B23, B20)
= (2z + 1) + x · 2(1 ⊗ z) (by B27, B28)
= (2z + 1) + x · (1 ⊗ (2z + 1)) (by B14)
= y + x · (1 ⊗ y). 






























Now suppose the result holds for any z with |z| = k. Consider y with |y| = k + 1, say y = 2z+ 1 where
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Proposition A.0.8. T |y| = |z| → drop(x ◦ y, z) = x.
Proof. Use induction on |z|. When |z| = 0, we have y = z = 0 by A.0.1, so that drop(x ◦ y, z) =
drop(x ◦ 0, 0) = x. When |y| = |z| = k, say z = 2u + 1, y = 2v + 1, |u| = |v| = k,
drop(x ◦ y, z) = drop(x ◦ (2v + 1), 2u + 1)
=
⌊










(by the preceding proposition)
= drop(x ◦ v, u) (by B32)
= x (by IH). 
Proposition A.0.9. T |y| = |z| → lv(x ◦ y, z) = y.
Proof. Suppose that |y| = |z|. We have
lv(x ◦ y, z) = (x ◦ y)−˙drop(x ◦ y, z) · (1 ⊗ z)
= (x ◦ y)−˙x · (1 ⊗ z) (by A.0.8)
= y + x · (1 ⊗ y)−˙x · (1 ⊗ z) (by A.0.6)
= y (by B15, B16 and B35). 
Proposition A.0.10. T |x| = |y1 ◦ y2| → ∃x1∃x2(|x1| = |y1| ∧ |x2| = |y2| ∧ x = x1 ◦ x2).
Proof. Use induction on |y2|, along with axiom B10. 
Proposition A.0.11. T |x| = |y1 ◦ y2| → (|drop(x, y2)| = |y1| ∧ |lv(x, y2)| = |y2|).
Proof. Immediate from A.0.10, A.0.8 and A.0.9. 
Proposition A.0.12. (C′9)
T #(|x1| = |y1| ∧ |x2| = |y2|) = #(|x| = |y1 ◦ y2|)[drop(x, y2)/x1, lv(x, y2)/x2].
Proof. The proof will use counting axiom C3, along with A.0.8 and A.0.9. Let C1 denote #(|x1| =
|y1| ∧ |x2| = |y2|) and C2 denote #(|x| = |y1 ◦ y2|)[drop(x, y2)/x1, lv(x, y2)/x2]. To begin, we note
that it is not hard to show, by induction on |y2|, that if |x1| = |y1| and |x2| = |y2|, then |x1◦x2| = |y1◦y2|,
and that ◦ is injective, that is, if |x| = |x′|, |y| = |y′| and x ◦ y = x′ ◦ y′, then x = x′ and y = y′. Now to
show that C1C2 it sufﬁces, as ◦ is injective, to show that for every x1 and x2 satisfying , where |x1| =
|y1| and |x2| = |y2|, there is some x with length |y1 ◦ y2| which satisﬁes [drop(x, y2)/x1, lv(x, y2)/x2].
Let x = x1 ◦ x2. As stated above, |x| = |y1 ◦ y2|. Also by A.0.8, drop(x, y2) = x1 and by A.0.9,
lv(x, y2) = x2, and C1C2 follows by C3, taking r(x1, x2, x) = 0 iff x = x1 ◦ x2. We now want to show
that C2C1. Consider any x with |x| = |y1 ◦ y2| such that x satisﬁes [drop(x, y2)/x1, lv(x, y2)/x2]. By
A.0.10, there are x1, x2 with |x1| = |y1|, |x2| = |y2| and x = x1 ◦ x2. 
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For C′10, we require the following fact about ⊕:
Proposition A.0.13. T |v| = |x| → (x ⊕ v) ⊕ v = x.
Proof. Use LINDo on |v|. When |v| = 0, we have v = 0 by A.0.1, and the result is immediate from the
deﬁnition of ⊕. Now suppose that the result holds for any v′ with v′ = k, and consider v with |v| = k+1,
say v = 2v′ + 1. Since |x| = |v| = k + 1, it follows from B32 and B33 that for some x′ with |x′| = k,
x = 2x′ + 1 or x = 2x′ + 2. Consider the case where x = 2x′ + 2. We have
(x ⊕ v) ⊕ v = (2x′ + 2 ⊕ 2v′ + 1) ⊕ 2v′ + 1
= (2 · (x′ ⊕ v′) + 2) ⊕ 2v′ + 1 (by deﬁnition of ⊕)
= (2 · ((x′ ⊕ v′) ⊕ v′)) + 2 (by deﬁnition of ⊕)
= 2x′ + 2 (by IH)
= x.
The other cases are similar. 
Corollary A.0.14. T x = x′ → x ⊕ v = x′ ⊕ v.
Proposition A.0.15. (C′10)
T |v| = |y| → #(|x| = |y|)C = #(|x| = |y|)C[x ⊕ v/x].
Proof. We ﬁrst note that it is not hard to show using LINDo that if |v| = |x| then |x ⊕ v| = |x| (*).
Suppose that C has the form #(|x| = |y|). Fix |v| = |y|, and assume
|x| = |y| ∧ |x| = |y| ∧ .
By A.0.13 and (*), it follows that
T |x ⊕ v| = |y| ∧ |x| = |y| ∧ [(x ⊕ v) ⊕ v/x].
So by A and C3,
T #(|x| = |y|)C#(|x| = |y|)C[x ⊕ v/x].
It also follows immediately by A and C3 that
T #(|x| = |y|)C[x ⊕ v/x]#(|x| = |y|)C. 
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To prove C′11, we will require the following:
Lemma A.0.16. The following are both theorems of T , for any formula :
1. ∀x((|x| = |2k + 1| ∧ bin(x)k) → ∃x((|x| = |2(k + 1) + 1| ∧ bin(x)k))).
2. ∀x((|x| = |2(k + 1) + 1| ∧ bin(x)k) → ∃x((|x| = |2k + 1| ∧ bin(x)k))).
Proof. We begin by deﬁning the functions zpl (“zero pad left’’) and zdl (“zero drop left’’) as follows:
zpl(x) = x + (x ⊗ 1), zdl(x) = x − (x ⊗ 1). Also, bin−1 is deﬁned such that bin−1(l, x), assuming
that l |2x + 1|, returns the binary notation of x, zero padded on the left to length l. Clearly, the dyadic
representation of zpl(x) is just the dyadic representation of x padded on the left by a single 0, while if the
dyadic representation of x starts with a 0, then zdl(x) is the dyadic representation of x with the leading
0 removed. Recall that bin(x) = x − (x ⊗ 1) + 1. It follows from the BASIC axioms that for all x,
bin(x) = bin(zpl(x)). By the deﬁnition of bin and zpl, this is equivalent to showing
x − (x ⊗ 1) + 1 = x + (x ⊗ 1) − ((x + (x ⊗ 1)) ⊗ 1) + 1.
To begin, we may show using LINDo that |x + (x ⊗ 1)| = |2x + 1|. When |x| = 0, we have x = 0 by
A.0.1, so that
|x + (x ⊗ 1)| = |0 + (0 ⊗ 1)|
= |0 + 1| (by B13)
= |2 · 0 + 1| (by B25)
= |2x + 1|.
Now suppose that this equation holds for y with |y| = k. Suppose |x| = k + 1. If x = 2y + 1,
|x + (x ⊗ 1)| = |2y + 1 + ((2y + 1) ⊗ 1)|
= |2y + 1 + 2 · (y ⊗ 1)| (by B15 and B14)
= |2(y + (y ⊗ 1)) + 1| (by B20 and B28)
= |y + (y ⊗ 1)| + 1 (by B10)
= |2y + 1| + 1 (by Induction Hypothesis)
= |2(y + 1) + 1| (by B10)
= |2x + 1|.
We can give a similar proof when x = 2y + 2. Similarly, we may show that for any x and k such that
|x| = |2(k + 1) + 1| and b(x)k, bin(zdl(x)) = bin(x). The proposition then follows immediately. 
Proposition A.0.17. (C′11) For any counting term C, the following is a theorem of T :
#(ik + 1)C = C[k + 1/i] + #(ik)C.
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Proof. Suppose that C has the form #(|x| = |y|). Let l = 2(k + 1) + 1 and l′ = 2k + 1. We then have
#(ik + 1)C
= #(|x| = |l| ∧ |x| = |y|)(bin(x)k + 1 ∧ [bin(x)/i]) (by Deﬁnition)
= #(|x| = |l| ∧ |x| = |y|)((x = bin−1(l, k + 1) ∨ bin(x)k) ∧ [bin(x)/i]) (by C3)
= C[k + 1/i] + #(|x| = |l|)(bin(x)k ∧ [bin(x)/i]) (by C′7, C′8 and C3)
= C[k + 1/i] + #(|x| = |l′|)(bin(x)k ∧ [bin(x)/i]) (by Lemma A.0.16 and C3)
= C[k + 1/i] + #(ik)C. (by Deﬁnition)
Proposition A.0.18.
∀m |z|(∀i < m(C(i) = C′(i + 1))→ #(im)C − #(im)C′
= C(m) − C′(0)).
Proof. We use LINDo on m. When m = 0, the result follows by C′4. Now suppose that it holds for
m = k.We will show that the result holds for m = k+1. Suppose that for all i < k+1, C(i) = C′(i+1)
(*). Then
#(i < m + 1)C − #(i < m + 1)C′
= #(i < k + 2)C − #(i < k + 2)C′
= C(k + 1) + #(i < k + 1)C − (C′(k + 1) + #(i < k + 1)C′) (by C′11)
= C(k + 1) − C′(k + 1) + C(k) − C′(0) (by IH)
= C(k + 1) − C(k) + C(k) − C′(0) (by *)
= C(k + 1) − C′(0)
Note that by choosing appropriate C and C′, we obtain (via C′6).
Corollary A.0.19.
∀m |z|(∀i < m(2|u|C(i) = 2|v|C′(i + 1))→ #(im)2|u|C
−#(im)2|v|C′ = 2|u|C(m) − 2|v|C′(0)).
This is the form of the principle that we actually use in the proof of Theorem 3.5.2.
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